Globalization, Openness and Economic Nationalism: Analytical and Conceptual Issues A Foreword to Globalization and Economic Nationalism in Asia by Singh, Ajit
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Globalization, Openness and Economic
Nationalism: Analytical and Conceptual
Issues A Foreword to Globalization and
Economic Nationalism in Asia
Ajit Singh
University of Cambridge
6 July 2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/53039/
MPRA Paper No. 53039, posted 19 January 2014 18:47 UTC
     
Globalization, Openness and Economic Nationalism: 
Analytical and Conceptual Issues  
A Foreword to Globalization and Economic Nationalism in Asia 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Ajit Singh 
 
Emeritus Professor of Economics,  University of Cambridge 
Life Fellow Queens’ College Cambridge 
Tun Ismail Ali Chair, University of Malaysia 
 
 
 
 
 
July 2011 
 
 
 
This is a revised text of a keynote address given at the conference on globalization and economic nationalism in Asia, 
organized by the Asia Research Centre, Copenhagen Business School, December 3 2009.  Financial Support from 
Cambridge Endowment for Research in Finance and the Malaysian Commonwealth Trust is gratefully acknowledged.  
The author also wishes to thank the Centre for Business Research at Cambridge for the general support of this research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This book to which the present paper provides a foreword, investigates the 
interactions between globalization and economic nationalism in Asian countries. In 
this foreword, for South Asian countries the question of economic nationalism is 
considered through the lens of economic openness. Full globalisation, which 
connotes close or total integration of countries’ economies with that of the world 
economy, is the antonym of economic nationalism. The paper argues that economic 
openness is a multi-dimensional concept. A country can be open or not so open, in 
all or some of the following directions: trade, exports, imports, finance, science, 
culture, education, migration, foreign investment, investment by its citizens and 
companies abroad, among other things. There is no economic theory that suggests 
that a country has to be open in all dimensions simultaneously. Given its economic 
and geographical situation, a country may choose to be open in some areas and not 
at all, or only partially in others. The foreword examines the analytical question: 
what is the optimum degree of openness for an economy?  
 
At the simplest level a policy of total autarky is not necessarily one that coincides 
with economic nationalism. National economic benefits may increase with some 
trading compared with no trade at all. Orthodox economists would argue that a 
nation’s gains from trade with the rest of the world are best enhanced by the policy 
of free trade. This proposition which has long been a bedrock of orthodox 
economics is challenged in this essay in relation to its theoretical basis and its 
application in the real world.  It is argued that there are only narrow circumstances 
in which the orthodox proposition is either analytically or historically valid. 
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II. Optimal degree of openness and economic planning
1
   
 
In principal, one way of defining the optimum degree of openness is by using the 
theory of national planning for this purpose. There is a considerable literature on 
this subject and with increasing ability to handle complex optimization models on 
more powerful computers, it led to some improvements compared with the initial 
exercises carried out by Chenery, Bruno and several others in the late fifties. 
 
However, as Chakravarty and Singh (1998) pointed out long ago that there may be 
many reasons to believe that the approach is not entirely satisfactory. While a 
planning approach does avoid easy and facile identification of the optimal degree 
of openness with a regime of “free trade” it suffers from a number of limitations. 
Firstly, the planning analysis cannot take into account issues connected with 
irreversibility over time excepting by resort to very ad hoc procedures. 
 
Secondly, the only bit of connection of this approach with history is through initial 
specification of vectors of primary factors, which are easily quantifiable. There are 
no simple and convenient ways of quantifying the states of knowledge to the 
community or its degree of absorptive capacity if inflows of factors from the 
outside world are considered to be relevant. 
 
Thirdly, national planning models are rich in details for a single country. However 
to be operationally, meaningful they have to assume that the rest of the world is 
either going to stay constant or change only in a predetermined way. Strategic 
choices are excluded.  
                                                          
1
 Sections II and III adapt the arguments first presented in Chakravarty and Singh (1988) and more recently, in 
Singh (2011) to the requirements of this subject. 
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If one were to take these criticisms seriously, then the alternative to planning 
exercises would be a somewhat looser but a more historically grounded approach 
which not merely emphasizes the advantages that are likely to accrue to a national 
entity from exploring opportunities to trade with the rest of the world but also 
emphasizes certain factors which may make it more vulnerable to outside 
influences.  These may produce long term irreversible effects on the country’s 
pattern of production and its ability to generate productive employment, etc. 
 
It is important to note that such an alternative approach is quite consistent with the 
paradigm of classical economics, including in this respect not only Ricardo, but 
also Marshall in his capacity as a classical economist. Contrary to text book 
analysis it should be emphasized here that Ricardo was much more concerned with 
the effects of foreign trade on the rate and pattern of accumulation, than with the 
mere demonstration of the theorem of  `comparative advantage’, as an exercise in 
static optimization. When Ricardo pleaded for a greater degree of openness of the 
British economy, he was not being guided merely by his artificial example of trade 
in cloth and wine between England and Portugal, but because of the need to 
capitalize on the emerging features of the British economy in the light of 
revolution in textiles production. Marshall understood this very well when in his 
`Memorandum on the fiscal policy of international trade’, he wrote  “The 
principles on which our present fiscal system was based sixty years ago seem to 
me to be not ultimate derivative.  They were obtained by applying certain truths, 
which are as universal as the truth of geometry or mechanics, to certain conditions 
which were transitional” (Marshall, 1926; p.386).  He displayed a clear 
understanding of the historical specificity of maxims of policy of free trade which 
have been treated by many as ahistorical  truths. 
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While Marshall clearly recognised how the changes in configuration of production 
forces can alter the degree and character of openness of the economy, Keynes, it 
would appear, was worried about a somewhat different set of factors when he was 
devoting his thoughts to working out schemes for post-war national reconstruction. 
This has to do with maintaining equilibrium in the balance of payments of different 
countries. As he once put it, “ To suppose that there exists some smoothly 
functioning automatic mechanism of adjustment which preserves equilibrium if 
only we trust to methods of  ‘laissez-faire’ is a doctrinaire delusion which 
denigrates the lessons of historical experience without having behind it the support 
of sound theory” (Keynes, 1980; pp.21-22). Now it is clear that in history there 
have been periods, which as Keynes himself acknowledged, payments 
arrangements have worked out satisfactorily. This permitted large expansions of 
trade and trade-induced growth. However these have been episodes that have been 
characterised by the presence of suitable conjunctures, as the study of the economy 
for the period after the Second World War, the ‘golden age’, demonstrates (Glyn, 
Hughes, Lipietz and Singh, 1992). 
 
A country wishing to open up when the conjuncture is adverse in Keynes’ sense 
(that different economies are characterized by ‘ persistent surpluses’ or ‘deficits’ 
without there being any mechanism to restore global equilibrium) may benefit 
much less and, in certain cases, may end up being much worse off than if its 
opening-up process were differently timed. 
 
If timing makes a difference, and timing is indeed important, and if returns to scale 
are increasing, openness by virtue of assuring higher levels and growth rates of 
external demand may facilitate major structural changes in the economy and permit 
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labour productivity and the per capita consumption level to increase over time. If 
on the other hand, the timing is wrong, a country may have to go through painful 
processes of adjustment precisely because it is more  ‘open’ than otherwise. 
 
This would once again suggest that we ought to deal with the problem of openness 
in terms of rate and pattern of growth of output with due recognition to carry out 
structural changes as and when circumstances so warrant.  
 
III. Free Trade – A Critical Review   
 
The traditional economic answer to the question “What is the optimal degree of 
openness for the economy?” is given in terms of the theory of free trade. This 
theory is, however, extremely restrictive. Its validity depends on the existence of 
full employment in all economies, all round convexities in production functions, no 
indivisibilities together with other neoclassical assumptions such as no 
externalities, no information asymmetries, perfect knowledge about goods and 
services being traded.  
 
However they can be realised only in specific world economic conjuncture coupled 
with an appropriate set of domestic policies that go considerably beyond the limits 
of commercial policy as traditionally defined.  Two well-documented historical 
episodes where trade and growth-promoting forces interacted in a positive manner 
were connected with the hegemonic roles played by Britain and US respectively.  It 
has been pointed out by economic historians that Britain’s decision to adopt ‘free 
trade’ as the major thrust of their commercial policy helped to trigger the secular 
boom of the second half of the 19
th
 century.  But with changes in geo-political 
situation, coupled with altered industrial leadership consequent on the maturing of 
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major new innovations during the second Kondratieff, as described by Schumpeter, 
led to severe strains towards the end of the 19
th
 century, and led to the violent 
demise of the system. 
 
The question of increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition has received 
considerable attention in the recent developments in the theory of free trade. This 
literature has been reviewed by Paul R. Krugman, (a leading trade theorist and 
Nobel Prize winner) in his classic survey article. (Krugman, 1987) 
 
Krugman noted the work of Dixit, Spence, Stiglitz and others who tried to model 
trade in the context of Chamberlin-type imperfect competition along with the 
presence of increasing returns.  He carefully noted that in the type of ‘second-best’ 
world which alone is relevant in the contemporary context, there is no automatic 
tendency for gains from trade to be realised.  While the scope of gains from trade 
does not necessarily go down, the composition of trade changes significantly from 
inter-industry to intra-industry trade.  Furthermore the need for government 
intervention can no longer be ignored.   
 
While Krugman himself ends up with a justification for free trade, he noted that 
‘this is not the argument that free trade is optimal because markets are efficient.  
Instead, it is a sadder but wiser argument for free trade as a rule of thumb in a 
world whose politics are as imperfect as its market” (Krugman, 1987; p. 143).  
 
The main reason behind Krugman’s cautionary ending is that sophisticated 
interventionism is likely to be a difficult exercise in political economy.  However, 
in essence, it is difficult to expect, for the reasons that he has elaborated as well as 
for others, for the world trading system to gravitate to free trading as a generally 
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accepted rule of thumb.  Instead the argument is better viewed in terms of the need 
for ‘managed trade’.   
 
There are several reasons why trade needs to be managed.  These have to deal, in a 
basic sense, with the fact that ‘openness’ can be a mixed blessing.  The point was 
well understood by John Maynard Keynes when he changed his position from 
being a champion of free trade to that of an advocate for ‘national self-sufficiency’, 
in the midst of depression during the 1930s. However Keynes’s argument was 
more subtle than that of simple-minded economic nationalism. He was all in favor 
of free movement of people between countries, freedom from passport controls, 
free educational culture exchange, he was nevertheless opposed to the free 
movement of capital and goods as that led to mass unemployment. 
 
Notwithstanding the limited relevance of the nostrums of free trade and absolute 
openness, openness can nevertheless be a great advantage. ‘Openness’ can be 
found to be a great benefit for an economy for any of the following reasons: 
a) It may enable a country to concentrate its relatively specialised resources 
in areas of production where the world demand is highly income and 
price elastic; 
 
b) it may lead to diffusion of knowledge of the kind leading to considerable 
upgrading of the quality of local factors of production; 
 
c) it may lead to sufficient competitive pressure to eliminate certain forces of 
what Leibenstein has described as X-inefficiency; 
 
d) trade may lead to changes in the distribution of income which can lead to 
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a greater share of production accumulation in national income; 
 
e) Trade may facilitate what Schumpeter and, following him, Dahmen have 
stressed so much-namely an accelerated process of creative destruction; 
 
In all these cases, we are assuming that payment arrangements are such that there 
is no sizeable deflationary bias in the world economy or in any of the leading 
countries.  It was already noted in section II that Keynes was of the view that the 
classical theory of equilibrating payments arrangements was gravely deficient.  
The Bretton Woods system was meant to provide a mechanism that coordinated 
high levels of effective demand amongst trading countries.  The system lasted over 
the period 1945-71.  Since then the world economy and its institutional 
arrangements have evolved as will be discussed below.   
 
During the 19
th
 century, the world economic system operated in a manner that gave 
a semblance of plausibility to the classical theory; this was because the 
assumptions underlying the theory were often fulfilled. As Joan Robinson (1973) 
put it, “ There was enough unemployment to keep money wage rates in check.  
There were massive migrations reallocating the supply of labour between countries 
of low and high economic opportunity; and there was a continuous, though 
fluctuating, flow of international investment. (Robinson, 1973)
 
  
 
Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that there are situations in which 
increasing the openness of the economy may harm the quality of locally available 
factors.  This leads to the opposite syndrome to that mentioned earlier.  The 
classical example of this is the adverse impact of British cotton textiles on Indian 
cotton weavers in the 19
th
 century.  
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Generally, it has been seen that ‘openness’ works positively if the phenomenon of 
‘learning’ from contacts with the rest of the world are suitably institutionalised, and 
through suitable adaptation on the policy side involving appropriate government 
interventions which make the domestic economy more responsive to change.  The 
experience of Japan and that of the Asian NICs would seem to suggest that home 
market expansion can often trigger off growth-promoting investment which then 
leads sequentially to import and export substitution on highly efficient lines.  In its 
turn, home market expansion may have much to do with increases in food 
productivity level. Arthur Lewis also strongly underlined the importance of food 
productivity growth as a method of overcoming the terms of trade loss suffered by 
many tropical countries that concentrated their exports of beverages, etc. to cater to 
metropolitan market. 
 
In the absence of a growing home market accompanied by suitable diversification 
of the industrial structure, the effect of ‘openness’ can at best be a ‘once-for all 
gain’ from increased openness.  On occasion it may lead to a subsequent 
accentuation of the economic difficulties of the country that which liberalized its 
trade and investment policies in the expectation of sustained growth but without 
adequate preparation on the knowledge absorption side. 
 
To sum up it is important to pinpoint the phenomenon of learning over time as a 
more relevant paradigm for development gains through trade as distinct from the 
neoclassical emphasis on exploitation of arbitrage opportunities. John Stuart Mill 
was fully aware of this dimension in his classical writings on the subject, as was 
Alfred Marshall whose ‘Memorandum of Fiscal policy of International Trade’ was 
mentioned earlier.  More recently, L.L. Pasinetti has always been very emphatic on 
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this point. (Pasinetti, 1981; Chapter 11) 
 
Despite the many conceptual and operational difficulties of the classical and 
neoclassical arguments for free trade there are indeed substantive benefits from 
economic openness which are more robust than the traditional neoclassical 
arguments.  However they can be realised only in specific world economic 
conjuncture coupled with an appropriate set of domestic policies that go 
considerably beyond the limits of commercial policy as traditionally defined.  Two 
well-documented historical episodes where trade and growth-promoting forces 
interacted in a positive manner were connected with the hegemonic roles played by 
Britain and US respectively.  It has been pointed out by economic historians that 
Britain’s decision to adopt ‘free trade’ as the major thrust of their commercial 
policy helped to trigger the secular boom of the second half of the 19
th
 century.  
But with changes in geo-political situation, coupled with altered industrial 
leadership consequent on the maturing of major new innovations during the second 
Kondratieff, as described by Schumpeter, led to severe strains towards the end of 
the 19
th
 century, and led to the violent demise of the system. 
 
Similarly in the golden age of capitalism in the 1950’s ad 1960’s, west European 
economies achieved historically unprecedented growth of 5% per annum, twice the 
rate they had experiences during the previous 200 years. They not only obtained 
full employment for 25 years but in fact had overfull employment. In countries 
such as Germany and France, 10% of the labour force came from abroad. Analysis 
of this historic episode indicates that it was based on a new economic model of 
solidarity and cooperation both within and between nation states. This model was 
ushered in Western Europe with the help of the US marshal plan.  
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The financial and trading openness for developing countries recommended as 
panacea in the present world situation is based on completely a historical 
understanding of growth problems in an increasingly interdependent world, an 
understanding which, on its own logic, is by no means free from difficulties as 
analysed earlier.  It is therefore essential that we attempt to analyse the historical 
forces which led to the rise and fall of the so called ‘golden age of capitalism’ in 
Western Europe. By the same token, we need to analyse and examine the present 
era of globalization in historical terms. 
 
Since the demise of the golden age in the 1970’s, the world economy has evolved. 
Most developed countries have adopted more or less free trade and more or less 
free capital movements since the 1980’s. A number of developing countries have 
done the same since the 1990’s. It is this regime of globalisation which integrates 
global product and capital markets which provides the backdrop to the discussion 
of issues of economic nationalism addressed in this book. The editor is quite right 
to point out that economic nationalism is still widely practised, notwithstanding 
globalisation, by most successful as well as unsuccessful countries.  All that has 
happened is that different measures have to be introduced to advance the national 
interest compared with before. 
 
This book provides analysis of economic nationalism in five leading Asian 
countries: India, China, Korea, Japan and Singapore. Each of these countries has 
adapted its interventions to the requirements of the new international trading and 
financial regime. The detailed analysis of this book indicates the globalisation has 
not been negated by economic nationalistic measures adopted in one form or 
another by all five nations; nor has economic nationalism been able to overcome 
the institutional framework of globalisation. To use a different language what has 
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happened is that Asian countries have sought not close integration with the world 
economy, but a strategic integration. They have been open in some spheres and not 
in others according to their national advantage. Before globalisation this was easily 
possible for the Asian countries to do so. Under the new WTO and international 
legislations, policy space for most developing countries has been much diminished 
compared with before. 
 
IV. Globalisation, Economic Nationalism and The Current International 
Crisis 
 
We turn now to the discussion of the relationship between globalization, economic 
crisis and economic nationalism in Asian countries. It is widely believed that 
financial globalisation and the world financial system have been responsible for the 
most acute economic crisis to hit the international economy since the great 
depression 60 years ago. The particularly poor performance of advanced countries 
is regarded as proof of the failure of globalisation. This is however a one sided 
view which ignores the fact that the crisis occurred only in rich countries and not in 
poor countries.  
 
The following facts concerning the crisis are pertinent from the perspective of the 
developing countries: 
 Since the beginning of the new millennium and until 2007 the world 
economy grew at an historically unprecedented pace. Between 2003 and 
2005, the economy grew at a rate of 5% per annum in PPP terms which has 
never been achieved before. 
 Developing countries growth rate was twice as fast as rich countries, thereby 
reducing the distance between the two groups of countries. 
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 World poverty (defined as earnings below a dollar a day) fell by a large 
margin in many countries and in the world as a whole. 
 India and China, the two most populous and hitherto among the poorest 
countries in the world achieved stellar economic performance. Other Asian 
countries also performed well prior to and since the crisis. 
 
The essential reason for the good performance of Asian countries lies in the 
measures adopted by these countries following the lessons they learned from the 
Asian crisis of 1997 – 1999. Following the crisis these countries started to strive 
for current account surpluses and to accumulate reserves, which stood them in very 
good stead during the current crisis. This was a triumph of economic nationalism 
over globalisation. Developing countries did not repudiate globalisation, but rather 
took advantage of it while protecting themselves against its dangers by adopting 
nationalistic economic policies towards reserves and balance payments. 
 
It does not however help in the long run that the rich countries did not performed 
well in the Great Recession for that would induce them to abandon globalisation. 
What is required for both the north and south to grow, for the north to achieve full 
employment and for the south to achieve fast rates of growth to minimise poverty 
and improve the desperately low living standards of the people. The research by 
Izuerita and Singh (2010) and Cripps, Izuerita and Singh (2011) indicates that if 
developing countries such as India and China were to grow at the desired rate this 
would be incompatible with full employment growth in developed countries. 
However the research also indicates that cooperation between rich and poor 
countries, particularly India, China and the US over technical progress (such as 
energy saving) can resolve these difficulties. Such cooperation is much to be 
preferred to the economic nationalism of the 1930’s, which led to stagnation and 
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crisis. A globalised world economy is in the interest of developing countries 
provided they have policy space to enable them to achieve fast growth and reduce 
poverty. 
 
Globalisation , together with international economic cooperation among nations 
states is a far better goal for developing and emerging countries to seek than 
economic nationalism, despite its successful use by Asian countries during the 
post-World War II period. 
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